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This paper investigates the ability of the Federal Reserve to manipulate the overnight rate
without open market operations (which Demiralp and Jorda (2000) term the
announcement effect), using high-frequency, open-market-desk data. Using similar data,
Hamilton (1997) takes advantage of forecast errors in the Treasury balance to compute
the elasticity of the federal funds rate to these errors and thus to obtain a measure of the
liquidity effect. Similarly, one can view daily deviations of the federal funds rate from
target as forecast errors in the reserve need (see Taylor, 2000). By analyzing the manner
and the type of operation the Fed uses to maintain the federal funds rate close to its
targeted value and by observing the pattern of operations on the days surrounding a
change in this target, we provide evidence of the announcement effect. Furthermore, we
show that the discipline of the FOMC schedule dictates, not only the process of
expectations formation in the overnight rate, but also the price adjustment process of term
rates.
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1. Introduction
The textbook view of the monetary transmission mechanism rests on the central bank’s
ability to manipulate the overnight interest rate via its monopolistic control of the supply
of reserves followed by some form of rational expectations mechanism that ensures
movements in the overnight rate appropriately reverberate into longer maturity rates.
However, while there is little disagreement that the central bank effectively controls the
overnight rate, the notion that it does so via a liquidity effect and the nature of term
structure relations need to be revised.
Modern central banking is characterized, at a minimum, by public announcements
of an interest rate target (such as the federal funds rate target in the U.S.), sometimes, by
additionally disclosing an inflation target (such as the Bank of Australia, and the Bank of
England), and in the extreme, by making the parameters of the policy reaction function
publicly available (such as the Reserve Bank of New Zealand). This constitutes a
significant departure from traditional central banking.
Why have central banks abandoned their recalcitrant secretive behavior in favor
of these public disclosures about their policy moves? It is natural to conjecture that the
reasons may include better and more precise control of the overnight rate, but probably
and more importantly, better communication on future policy moves: in essence, the holy
grail of controlling long rates by manipulating expectations as well.
This paper investigates these issues for the U.S. Federal Reserve. In particular,
we focus on the effect that the 1994 new policy of announcing the targeted level of the
federal funds rate had on the liquidity effect and the manner the Fed uses open market
operations to control the federal funds market. Moreover, we want to investigate what
effect, if any, did this change in policy have on the behavior of the term structure.
Up until the February 3-4, 1994 Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)
meeting, monetary policy objectives for the federal funds rate and the outcome of the
FOMC meeting itself, were never announced and had been kept confidential.
2
Subsequent to the 1994 policy change to disclose the new targeted level for the federal
2 However, Demiralp and Jorda (2000) argue that perhaps as early as mid-November 1989, there was little
if any ambiguity in decoding any changes in the federal funds rate target on the basis of the pattern of open
market operations that followed the meeting. Their evidence mainly consists on the fact that the prime rate
was typically adjusted within a day or two of an unannounced federal funds rate target change.3
funds rate, and inspired by similar developments in other central banks, the papers by
Demiralp and Jordá (2000), Guthrie and Wright (2000), Taylor (2000), Thornton (2000)
and Woodford (2000), investigate a central bank’s ability to control the overnight rate,
not merely with traditional open market operations, but by effectively communicating the
desired level of the overnight rate and standing ready to enforce that level. According to
Meulendyke (1998), “The [federal funds] rate has tended to move to the new preferred
level as soon as the banks know the intended rate…” In this paper we term this way of
controlling the overnight rate as the announcement effect (following Demiralp and Jordá,
2000) and it differs from the conventional liquidity effect in that the volume of open
market operations required to achieve the new targeted level is substantially smaller
because of expectations.
The strategy we pursue to investigate the announcement effect consists on using
two types of control. The first is to analyze the data with two primary sub-samples: one
predating and the other postdating the 1994 policy change. The second is to compare,
within sub-sample, the pattern of open market operations surrounding days in which the
target was changed relative to the rest of the sub-sample.
Most of the time, open market operations carried by the Trading Desk at the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York (or the Desk for short) are designed to accommodate
variations in the reserve need that stem from a variety of factors (such as changes in
currency holdings, float, large Treasury balances, etc.), to manage currency in circulation,
and other variations in the reserve supply. Based on a particular type of such variations
(unexpectedly large Treasury balances), Hamilton (1997) calculates the interest rate
elasticity to an unanticipated reserve shortfall. In this paper, we measure the elasticity of
different types of open market operations to variations in the reserve need, expectations
of a target change and enforcement of a new target level instead.
The expectation that policy decisions on whether to change the federal funds rate
target will typically follow FOMC meetings introduces a natural discipline in term rates,
and more specifically, in the manner expectations on future rates are updated according to
the FOMC calendar. Consequently, we investigate whether indeed the market follows
this discipline and whether the response of term rates on the FOMC calendar is consistent
with the rational expectations hypothesis of the term structure.4
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the nature of the
announcement effect and the role of expectations in the context of a simple model of the
reserves market proposed by Taylor (2001). Based on the insights of this model,
deviations of the federal funds rate from its targeted value emerge as indicators of the
Desk’s forecast error of the reserve need. These deviations can therefore be used to asses
how the Desk manages different types of open market operation to maintain the funds
rate on target, as well as to signal changes in this target. Thus, Section 3 reviews the
behavior of the deviation of the funds rate from target over the maintenance period while
Section 4 presents detailed evidence of the emergence of the announcement effect since
1994. The same mechanism that ties the formation of expectations around the FOMC
calendar and gives rise to the announcement effect determines the behavior of term
interest rates. Section 5 documents how movements in term rates are closely tied to the
expectations formation associated to the FOMC calendar. Section 6 summarizes the main
findings and concludes.
2. The Federal Funds Market and Open Market Operations
The stylized model of the reserves market (described for example in Gilbert, 1985,
Heller, 1988, and Goodfriend and Whelpey, 1993) describes a downward sloping demand
schedule of reserves as a function of the federal funds rate. This relation reflects the
demand for reservable deposits on behalf of depository institutions and therefore, reserve
requirements and excess reserves. The supply of reserves is depicted as a kinked
schedule: a perfectly inelastic supply of reserves section corresponding to the level of
nonborrowed reserves determined by open market operations, and an upward sloping
section corresponding to discount window borrowing. The slope of the latter section of
the supply schedule is characterized by the spread between the discount rate and the
federal funds rate along with the administrative costs of having tapped a resource that is
directly rationed by the corresponding regional Federal Reserve Bank. Under this simple
framework, an open market sale has the effect of reducing nonborrowed reserves, thus
shifting the supply schedule to the left, and increasing the equilibrium level of the federal
funds rate along with the amount of discount window borrowing.5
Recent developments in the reserves market require that we refine this canonical
model. First, the collapse of the Continental Illinois Bank and Trust Company and other
similar failures in the mid-eighties has made banks significantly more reluctant to use the
discount window (although extended credit reached volumes in excess of $7 billion at the
height of the crisis, this volume has remained essentially at zero levels throughout the
nineties). As a consequence, the supply of reserves is now better characterized by its
inelastic section, which is determined by nonborrowed reserves alone.
Secondly, banks hold reserves primarily for two reasons: (i) to meet legal reserve
requirements, and (ii) to facilitate interbank payments. Reductions in reserve
requirements (in 1990, and 1992), along with a clarification of Fed policy and advances
in computer technology that since 1994 have encouraged banks to be more aggressive in
“sweeping” customer deposits subject to reserve requirements into instruments exempt
from such requirements (see Anderson and Raasche, 2000), have significantly reduced
reserve requirements (from $20 billion in 1990, to $10 billion in 1996 and to $4 billion
today). However, banks still need reserves to meet interbank payments and to meet the
demand for currency. Thirdly, and more importantly, since the February 3-4, 1994
FOMC meeting, the Fed has publicly disclosed its targeted level for the federal funds
rate. This has had a significant effect on the process of price discovery in the federal
funds market and on the manner the market forms expectations about future policy
moves.
The emphasis on the rising role of expectations in the reserves market is
highlighted in a recent paper by Taylor (2000). The federal funds market is essentially a
“double auction” market in which buyers and sellers ask different prices on overnight
loans. Thus, the effective federal funds rate is a volume weighted average of rates on
trades reported by brokers. The Fed does not directly trade in the federal funds market
but controls the amount of reserves by trading in the repo (RP) and Treasury markets,
typically once a day, in the morning (since April 5, 1999, the Trading Desk enters the
market during a 10 minute interval around 9:30 am). On the other hand, trading in the
federal funds market concentrates near to the closing for the day.6
Banks meet their legal reserve requirements on an average over a two-week period
called the maintenance period. Prior to August 18, 1998
3 the calculation of the
requirement was done concurrently with the maintenance period, and was known as
contemporaneous reserve accounting (CRA). As we shall see, this induced substantial
volatility in the federal funds rate in the final days of the maintenance period. However,
since 1998, the Fed has reverted to computing the requirement over a two-week period
that precedes the maintenance period (the maintenance period starts 30 days after the start
of the corresponding 14-day computation period, see Clouse and Dow, 2000). This
practice is termed lagged reserve accounting (LRA) and it has eliminated any
contemporaneous elasticity of reserve requirements to the interest rate. However, notice
that reserve requirements have been decreasingly important in explaining a bank’s desire
to hold reserves relative to reserves needed to clear interbank balances.
The motivation behind Taylor’s (2001) model is the observation that changes in the
target may affect the federal funds rate even without open market operations. This effect
requires the credibility that the Trading Desk will appropriately react to any substantial
deviations of the federal funds rate from target. In order to focus the discussion on the
announcement effect and with the disclaimer that any model of the federal funds market
is at best, a rough approximation of the complexities in this market, Taylor (2001)
describes the demand for reserves
4 as
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d
t f E f R ε γ α + − − = + ) ( 1 , 0 , > γ α (1)
where
d
t R is the stock of reserve balances, t f is the effective funds rate, t ε is a demand
shock, and t E is the conditional expectation operator based on information available up to
time t. The specification in (1) can be understood as describing within maintenance
period bank behavior and abstracts from other direct demand factors (such as other
3 Although the date of the actual change in policy is July 1998, because there is a 30-day delay from the
computation period to the maintenance period, the first maintenance period that effectively reflected the
new policy was the 8/13/1998 to 8/26/1998 maintenance-period. It should also be emphasized that the Fed
had experimented with LRA in the past but prior to the beginning of our sample.
4 For a more detailed model of the demand for reserves see the papers by Clouse and Dow (2000), and
Bartolini, Bertola and Prati (1999).7
determinants of client demand for deposits) that are likely to influence reserve demand
across maintenance periods.
Equation (1) is a rational expectations setting in which the demand for reserves is
now a function of the expected federal funds rate: that is, changes in the effective rate
lead to movements along the demand curve but changes in the expected rate lead to shifts
in the demand schedule, thus eliminating any arbitrage opportunities.
When the Federal Reserve is more open about current policy actions and future
goals, the process of expectations formation about future policy actions gets more
accurate and reliable: the timing of the change is tied down by the dates of FOMC
meetings (with a few exceptions since 1994), and the magnitude of the change is usually
a toss between a one quarter and a one half percentage points change (the norm since
1994 except for one 75 percentage point change). Therefore, one would expect the
demand for reserves to adjust in anticipation of the forthcoming policy move. This shift
in demand may or may not be then offset by the Federal Reserve.
The supply of reserves in Taylor’s (2001) model is defined as a function of the gap
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Accordingly, the Federal Reserve changes the reserve supply for two reasons: (i) to
accommodate an unexpected variation in the reserve need (i.e. whenever the funds rate is
expected to deviate from the given target), or (ii) for a given level of the funds rate, to
adjust the pressure in the reserves market in a manner consistent with a new target level.
Orphanides (2001) has suggested that (2) may be too simple a specification of the supply
curve. Among other things, it is perhaps more realistic to describe the Fed as actually
forecasting the reserve need on the basis of Et-1(ft)–f
*
t-1 rather than reacting to past
deviations ft-1 – f
*
t-1.However, for the purposes of our discussion, there is little loss in
proceeding with Taylor’s original specification, leaving for future work alternative
variations on expression (2).
Figure 1 describes the role of expectations and the behavior of interest rates in the
reserves market. This figure depicts the usual, downward sloping demand schedule and8
an inelastic supply schedule set at the level of nonborrowed reserves (NBR) (following
our discussion that there is almost zero discount window borrowing at present). In this





1 f . The first scenario describes the traditional story: there is no anticipation
of the policy actions and the Federal Reserve has to signal the entire target change
through open market operations by cutting down reserves from NBR0 to NBR1
old.
The second and the third scenarios consider the role of expectations in the reserves
market. When the market anticipates an increase in the target, it is more profitable for the
banks to borrow prior to the announcement and then lend after the announcement, which
leads to a shift of the demand curve to the right before the announcement, from D0 to D1.
Note that the corresponding intermediate change in the equilibrium funds rate from
*
0 f to
0 f is independent of any open market operations, and is purely due to the anticipation of
the new target level.
The Federal Reserve can respond to this shift in expectations in two ways: (i) by
accommodating and thus temporarily offsetting the expectational demand shift to D1 so
that the federal funds rate is kept at the present level,
*
0 f , or (ii) by remaining inactive
and allowing the federal funds rate to rise in anticipation of the target change. If the Fed
accommodates in anticipation of an increase in the federal funds rate, the Desk will
actually expand (rather than contract) reserves to the level NBR0
* before contracting to
the level NBR1
new. Whether or not the Fed decides to accommodate, the better the market
anticipates the Fed’s actions, the smaller the contraction from NBR0 to NBR1
new, i.e., the
Fed requires a smaller volume of open market operations to signal the market of an
increase in the federal funds rate which is the essence of the announcement effect.
3. Preliminary Considerations: Deviations of the Federal Funds Rate from Target
The empirical analysis we perform below will use the deviation of the effective federal
funds rate from the targeted level during the previous day as an indicator of reserve
imbalances. Changes in the target are typically announced around 2:15 pm EST, after
open market operations for that day have been already executed. Conditional on other9
factors, the response of open market operations to these imbalances gives us an indirect
measure of the liquidity effect. Let ft denote the federal funds rate and let ft
* denote the
target, the variable we explore is therefore, (ft-1 – ft-1
*).
5 Recall that the Fed typically
executes open market operations in the morning whereas most of the trading in the
federal funds market takes place near the closing of the trading day. Therefore,
deviations of the federal funds rate from target can be interpreted as forecast errors in the
reserve need for that day. This argument certainly characterizes the majority of our
sample up to August 18, 1998, when the Fed switched from contemporaneous reserve
accounting (CRA) to lagged reserve accounting (LRA). After the change to LRA,
uncertainty regarding reserve requirements was virtually eliminated although uncertainty
regarding balances for transactions purposes still remained.
To get a better sense of the persistence of this forecast error (or in other words,
how quickly it is eliminated) and the effects of the “seasonality” of the maintenance
period on both the magnitude and the dynamics of (ft-1 – ft-1
*), we experiment with the
following specification:
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i.e., a second order autoregression where the parameters are allowed to vary according to
the day of the maintenance period,
6 except for β since ∆ ft
*, which denotes a change in the
target on date t, is nonzero only when the target is changed. Equation (3) is estimated
over 3 different samples: April 25,1984 to February 4, 1994; February 4, 1994 to August
17, 1998, and August 18, 1998 to August 14, 2000. These sub-samples correspond to the
period prior to the policy of announcing the target, the period after that change in policy
5 Hamilton (1997) uses open market data to estimate the liquidity effect by carefully calculating the effect
of surprises in the Treasury balance on the federal funds rate. The requisite that this surprise component be
as accurately measured as possible required him to be extremely detailed in modeling all the sources of
seasonality relating to the Treasury balance and the other components of the Fed’s balance sheet – in
essence, he is trying to capture the manner the Fed constructs its forecasts. However, because the variable
of interest, (ft-1 – ft-1
*), is directly observable rather than computed, we are able to dispense with such
complications.










i it d ρ ρ for i=1 , 2and where dt
j = 1 if observation t belongs to
the j
th day of the maintenance period for j=1, 2, …, 10 (since we only need to consider business days); and
is 0 otherwise.10
with CRA, and the period in which the Fed switched from CRA to LRA. Figure 2
displays the variation in this average deviation and its persistence as a function of the day
of the maintenance period for these three samples.
7
The average deviation of the federal funds rate from target is significantly higher
(up to 20 basis points on average) on the last day of the maintenance period for the first
two sub-samples. However, notice that since reserve accounting was modified from
CRA to LRA, this average deviation has dwindled to essentially zero. Deviations from
target also tend to be lower on Fridays. This observation is consistent with Hamilton
(1996) and Clouse and Dow (2000) who argue that, although for different reasons,
reserves on Fridays are relatively more expensive. The dynamic pattern of these
deviations has also changed substantially across samples. It is most persistent in the first
sample, and toward the final days of the maintenance period. These observations are
consistent with the high volatility the federal funds rate typically exhibits during the last
days of the maintenance period. It is safe to say that over time, the Fed has managed to
reduce the average deviations from target and it has reduced the length of time it takes to
eliminate these perturbations.
The estimates of β in (3) provide suggestive evidence regarding how well target
changes are forecast. For each of the three sub-samples, these estimates (with standard
errors in parenthesis) are: 0.59 (0.12), 0.37 (0.17), and 0.43 (0.17), respectively. If target
changes were completely unexpected, the coefficient on the variable ∆ ft
* would be close
to 1 in value. This hypothesis is clearly rejected in all sub samples but perhaps more
importantly, the decrease of this coefficient from 0.59 to 0.37, after the policy of
announcing target changes was introduced, is statistically significant. This shift suggests
that expectations on policy moves may have improved after 1994, an issue we explore in
more detail in the next section.
7 For a more detailed investigation of the behavior of the federal funds rate and the interbank market, see
the papers by Bartolini, Bertola and Prati (2000), and Furfine (2000).11
4. The Announcement Effect versus the Liquidity Effect
This section investigates the manner in which the Trading Desk juggles different types of
open market operations in response to variations in the reserve need and, more
importantly, to changes in the federal funds rate target. In particular, we want to address
the following two questions:
1. Is there evidence that since the 1994 change in policy, the liquidity effect has
been complemented with the announcement effect and that therefore, there is an
appreciable difference in the type and size of operations needed to achieve the
new, targeted level for the federal funds rate?
2. Are there any differences in the portfolio of operations done during days when the
target is changed relative to other days?
The second question complements the first one in that differences in the portfolio
of operations during target day changes may help corroborate or disavow whether in fact
the Fed is any more responsive to these changes than it is to variations in the reserve
need. The sample period that we investigate extends from April 25, 1984 to August 14,
2000 and includes 115 changes in the target. This sample is split first, with the February
4, 1994 decision by the Fed to publicly announce any changes to the federal funds rate
target, and second, with the August 18, 1998 decision to move from CRA to LRA.
4.1 The Endogenous Variables: Types of Open Market Operations and Transformations
The available open market data consists of ten different types of operation, which
can be roughly grouped according to whether the operation injects or drains liquidity and
according to the relative degree of permanency of the operation. Table 1 classifies these
data with the mentioned criteria and assigns the acronyms we will use in the paper,
namely, PB, TB, and OB for permanent, temporary and overnight purchases (which add
liquidity); and PS, TS, and OS for permanent, temporary and overnight sales (which drain12
liquidity). This way of grouping the different types of operation affords us more degrees
of freedom at little cost: although the Fed does not consider domestic and foreign
purchases as complete substitutes (chiefly because of the clarity of the signal that they
deliver to the market with the former tool) they certainly fulfill different liquidity needs
relative to shorter-term operations.
8
Each of these operations needs to be further transformed before we initiate our
analysis. We begin by standardizing the volume of each type of operation by the volume
of total reserves held during the maintenance period prior to when the operation is
executed. The purpose of this normalization is to filter trends in the volume of reserves
(such as the increase in the demand for currency described above). The second
transformation is motivated by reserve accounting practices and the differing effects
operations have according to type and according to when they are executed within the
maintenance period.
Following Feinman (1993), we adjust temporary and overnight operations
according to the number of days spanned by the transaction (adjusting for weekends and
holidays) and then dividing by the number of days in the maintenance period (14).
9 If the
temporary transaction spans beyond the maintenance period, then we adjust by the
number of days left in the current maintenance period. Because we normalize by the
volume of total reserves in the preceding maintenance period, temporary transactions that
spill over adjacent maintenance periods have the reverse effect during the maintenance
period in which they mature.
For instance, a normalized 0.1
10 matched sale-purchase with a four-day maturity
(i.e. generically a temporary sale (TS) in our terminology) executed Tuesday of the
second week of the maintenance period, has the effect of lowering the normalized volume
of reserves by 2/14 of 0.1. At its maturity, Friday of the first week of the following
maintenance period, it will raise the normalized volume of liquidity by 12/14 of 0.1
(assuming the level of total reserves has remained constant over the two maintenance
8 Appendix A.1 describes the details of how the Trading Desk at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
actually implements open market operations.
9 Note that an overnight transaction executed on a Friday is not reversed until Monday and, therefore, its
effect on the maintenance-period average volume of reserves is that of a three-day transaction instead.
10 Note that the normalization eliminates the unit of measurement in favor of expressing liquidity as a
fraction of the volume of reserves in the previous maintenance period.13
periods, leaving the normalization unaffected). It is important to highlight that the effect
of this matched sale-purchase during the maintenance period in which it matures forms
part of the information set available when the operation is executed. Consequently, an
increase in the forecast for the reserve need may not prompt the Fed to inject liquidity if
several of these temporary transactions are slated to mature during that maintenance
period. Similarly, outright operations are assumed to be reversible only by a counterpart
outright transaction and consequently, they are considered permanent. Therefore, they
are adjusted by the number of days left in the maintenance period as well. Each type of
operation normalized with the procedure described above will be collected in the vector
Xt =( P B t,T B t,O B t,P S t,T S t,O S t)’.
4.2 The Explanatory Variables: Decomposing the ft –f t
* Deviations
The empirical strategy requires that we analyze the motivation behind the different types
of open market operation the Desk chooses to execute in any given day. As we have
seen, the Desk may intervene in the market for several reasons: (i) to accommodate
shocks in the demand for reserves in order to maintain the federal funds rate aligned with
the target, (ii) to accommodate expectations of future target changes reflected in the
demand for reserves, and (iii) to enforce a new target level. Accordingly, we argued in
Section 2 that the most natural candidate explanatory variable is the deviation of the
federal funds rate from target, (ft – ft
*). However, in order to separate each of the
motivations (i)-(iii) above, we refine this deviation into three components,
( ) [ ]
*
) ( 1 ) (
*
1 ) ( t m t m t t m t t f E w f f NEED ∆ + − ≡ − −
( )
*
) ( 1 ) ( t m t m t f E EXPECT ∆ ≡ − (4)
( )
*
) ( 1 ) (
*
t m t m t t f E f SURPRISE ∆ − ∆ ≡ −
The time subscript m(t) denotes the maintenance period m to which observation t belongs.
Therefore
*
1 ) ( − t m f denotes the value of the target at the start of the maintenance period to14
which observation t belongs, wt denotes the relative probability that a target change
occurs in day t of the current maintenance period, and ) (
*
) ( 1 ) ( t m t m f E ∆ − denotes expectations
of a target change for the maintenance period to which observation t belongs, conditional
on information available at the beginning of the maintenance period. Consequently, the
variable NEED is designed to proxy for reserve projections and reflects variations in the
approximated reserve need per se, but factoring expectations of a target change. Note
that expectations of a target change are formed at the beginning of the maintenance
period rather than daily (which is the type of expectation we explore in Section 5) since
we are interested in learning how those expectations affect the average volume of
reserves over the maintenance period. The weights wt then assign each day of the
maintenance period the probability that the expected target change will be realized on
that particular day. These weights correspond to the empirical frequency of the
distribution of target changes over the maintenance period.
The variable EXPECT denotes the beginning of the maintenance period
expectation of a change in the target rather than a one-day ahead forecast. Therefore, this
variable reflects the Fed’s willingness to accommodate or profit from these movements in
anticipation of a target change. Finally, the variable SURPRISE takes the value of zero
except when the target is changed, in which case, it measures the portion of a target
change that was unexpected. This term will therefore capture the response of open
market operations designed to enforce the new target level and would most closely
correspond in interpretation to the traditional mechanism that characterizes the liquidity
effect. Equation (4) implies that the sum of the NEED, EXPECT, and SURPRISE
variables is equivalent to:
( ) ( )
*
) ( 1 ) (
* *
1 ) ( ( t m t m t t m t f E f f f ∆ − ∆ + − − − (5)
which roughly corresponds to ft – ft
* : since the target is changed infrequently, the second
term in parenthesis is zero most of the time except to capture the unexpected component
of a target change.
The variables described in equation (4) require that we formulate forecasts of
future target changes at a maintenance period frequency rather than from one day to the15
next. Two options were natural at this point. The first was to measure expectations
directly from the federal funds futures market as is done in Kuttner (2000). However,
this strategy proved inadequate for two reasons: (i) data on the futures market is not
available before 1989, and (ii), we wanted maintenance period forecast horizons rather
than daily forecasts – a target change in any day of the maintenance period will affect the
average volume of reserves over the period and not just for that particular date. The
second option available was to use the forecasting models used in Demiralp and Jordá
(2000), which are based on the autoregressive conditional hazard model (ACH). The
ACH methodology allowed us to produce forecasts at a maintenance period frequency
starting with the April 25-May 9, 1984 maintenance period. The appendix provides a
brief description of the ACH model along with the specifications we used to construct the
forecasts. A more detailed discussion of the model is beyond the scope of this paper and
can be found in Hamilton and Jordá (2000) and Demiralp and Jordá (2000).
4.3 Modeling Open Market Operations
The transformations of the variables described in the preceding sections allow us to
analyze the determinants of each type of open market operation contained in the vector
Xt. The Desk engages in open market operations approximately 60% of the time
However, even the most common type of open market operation (OB) is used only about
35% of the time. Consequently, estimation of the Desk’s choice of operation cannot be
done with conventional estimators since the dependent variable remains unchanged
during most days in the sample. In addition, one could view a “sale” operation as the
negative of a “purchase” operation, and thus lump operations together according to their
maturity (a similar strategy is adopted in Feinman, 1993). We preferred to maintain each
type of operation separate to allow for the possibility that the Fed reacts asymmetrically.
Therefore, let xkt
* denote the latent level of the k
th type of open market operation,
w h i c hi sa ne l e m e n to fXt,a n dl e tzt contain 3 lags of all the elements of Xt.
11 If this latent
index xkt
* were observable, it would be natural to specify its model as,
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where the coefficients on the NEED and EXPECT variables are allowed to vary
according to the day of the maintenance period.
12 However, we do not in fact observe xkt
*


















Expression (7) makes explicit that the minimum size of an operation of the k
th type is ck,
otherwise the Fed does not engage in that operation and xkt = 0. Equation (6) describes
the latent process for the k
th type of open market operation, xkt
* as a function of reserve-
need forecast errors, changes in the target, expectations of such target changes, and other
open market operations conducted in previous days. From the econometric point of view,
equations (6) and (7) constitute a truncated regression. Under the assumption that the
errors are normally distributed, this model can be estimated as a standard tobit model (see
Maddala, 1983).
13
The specification in equations (6) and (7) is quite flexible. In particular, the
coefficient α t modifies the threshold ck so that the minimum size of the k
th operation is
allowed to vary over the maintenance period. The inclusion of three lags of all the
variables in Xt ensures the effect of the explanatory variables is measured independently
of any predictable response to previous open market operations but it also serves to
measure whether certain types of operation can be viewed as complements or substitutes




















j γ γ where dt
j = 1 if observation t
belongs to the j
th day of the maintenance period and is zero otherwise (note, j = 1, 2, …, 10).
13 In particular, denoting with φ t and Φ t the normal density and the distribution function respectively of
observation t, the log-likelihood can be expressed as: ∑∑ + Φ − = t t L φ log ) 1 log( log where the first
summation is over all the observations in which xkt = 0 and the second summation is over the remaining
observations.17
of the k
th type of operation. For example, in response to a reserve shortage, the Fed may
react with a combination of overnight and temporary purchase operations and it may
delay any sale operations it had planned. The coefficient on the lag value of the variable
NEED varies according to the day of the maintenance period to reflect the possibility that
the Fed may be more reluctant to intervene in the market certain days of the period
relative to others. A similar motivation justifies the variation in the coefficient on the
variable EXPECT. Finally, note that the variable SURPRISE enters contemporaneously
and with up to three lags to measure how quickly after the announcement does the Fed
need to signal the new level with open market operations.
14 A strong liquidity effect
would suggest that the parameters γ I
S are statistically significant and negative for open
market purchase operations, and statistically significant and positive for open market sale
operations. If these parameters are not statistically significant, we interpret this as
evidence in favor of the announcement effect. The next subsection reports the outcome of
these experiments.
4.4 Results
Table 2 contains a graphical summary of the signs of the coefficients associated
with the NEED, EXPECTED, and SURPRISE variables across samples and for the
regressions involving the purchase operations only.
15 Table 3 contains a graphical
summary of the signs of the cross correlations at different lags among the elements of Xt,
also broken down by sample. In particular, ++/+ (--/-) indicates a positive (negative)
parameter that is significant at the 95%/90% confidence level. A “.” Indicates a
coefficient that is not statistically significant. Tables 4 and 5 contain the coefficient
estimates and standard errors for the SURPRISE regressors for both the purchase and the
sale operations.
14 Unlike some of the previous regressors, note that this variable is zero for every day in the sample except
when the target is changed.
15 Due to the low frequency with which “sale” operations are used (typically less than 5% of the time), we
have omitted those operations from Table 2 to simplify the exposition. The results with the sale operations
are supportive of the same conclusions that are supported with the purchase data but typically involve far
fewer observations, are therefore more unreliable, and in some instances we were unable to estimate the
model due to an insufficient number of observations.18
Before we comment on the results, it is worth discussing some elements of the
estimation. First, the coefficients associated with the variable SURPRISE are difficult to
estimate for three reasons: (i) there are only 115 target changes in total relative the 4,251
daily observations, (ii) the Desk seems to have shifted its preferences somewhat over the
type of operation it uses to support a target change, variation in the reserve need, or
accommodation of expectations of a target change, and (iii) some operations are rather
infrequent (such as most “sale” operations), meaning that most of the days in the sample,
these observations take the value zero. Despite these shortcomings, the “purchase” data
(OB, TB, PB) contain a sufficient number of non-zero observations, thus allowing for
reasonable coefficient estimates. The estimates from the “sale” data (OS, TS, PS)
confirm the findings with the “purchase” data in the sense that the coefficient estimates
typically have the opposite sign of those in the “purchase” equations.
The estimates for the first sample (from April 25, 1984 to February 3, 1994) of
“purchase” operations are representative of the canonical model of the federal funds
market. Although outright transactions are more frequent (32% of the time), these do not
appear to be linked to fluctuations in the reserve need. This finding substantiates the
claim that permanent operations are mostly used for technical reasons. By contrast,
overnight operations (OB), although less frequent (10% of the time), clearly respond to
variations in the need in the direction of accommodating imbalances in the deviation of
the federal funds rate from target. There appears to be little response to market
expectations of a target change except for the first Friday in the maintenance period. The
behavior of the SURPRISE variable is entirely consistent with a conventional liquidity
effect: in order to drive the federal funds rate to its new, targeted level, the Fed
injects/drains liquidity as needed. In fact, although the lag 1, and lag 3 coefficients are
not statistically significant, all the coefficients have a negative sign, further substantiating
this claim.
The dynamic correlations displayed in Table 3 suggest a fair amount of smoothing
in the manner operations occur. Purchase operations appear to be complementary of
each other in much the same way that sale operations are (the signs of the boxes along the
diagonal are positive and significant). By contrast, purchase and sale operations are19
typically substitutes of one another (the signs of the boxes in the off-diagonal terms are
usually negative and significant).
What is the effect of the new policy of announcing the target? First, the portfolio
of operations shifts from permanent operations toward more temporary operations. In
particular, while permanent operations (PB) where used 32% of the time in the 1984-
1994 sub-sample, they were only used 11% and then 17% of the time over the 1994-1998
and 1998-2000 sub-samples respectively. Conversely, overnight operations (OB), which
took place 10% of the time in the 1984-1994 sub-sample, are executed 27% and then
58% of the time during the 1994-1998 and 1998-2000 sub-samples respectively, a
significant change.
Next, consider the evidence reported in the two rightmost blocks in Table 2. The
pattern of responses to variations in the reserve need is similar to that in the first sub-
sample. However, the response to expectations of a target change is somewhat mixed in
the 1994-1998 sub-sample (OB operations are negative and significant on Thursdays,
although TB operations are significant and positive on the first day of the maintenance
period) but becomes noticeably more accommodating by the last sub-sample, typically in
the form of TB operations early in the maintenance period. The pattern of coefficients
for the SURPRISE variable seems to validate our notion that the Fed does not require
open market operations to signal a new level for the federal funds rate. In the 1994-1998
sub-sample, the lag 0 coefficient is positive and marginally significant, suggestive of
accommodation rather than enforcement. The lag 1 coefficient is negative and
marginally significant which suggests that to some degree, open market operations were
required to achieve the new targeted level of the federal funds rate, once it was
announced.
These results confirm some of the hypotheses advanced in the previous sections
and can be summarized as follows:
1. The announcement effect appears to be confirmed by the data, particularly for the
1998-2000 sub-sample. However, caution is advised since the last two sub-
samples contain a smaller number of target changes (20 between them) relative to
the 1984-1994 sub-sample, which contained 95 changes.20
2. Expectations of a target change appear to be somewhat reinforced in the second
sub-sample but mostly accommodated in the third sub-sample. In either case, the
Fed’s reaction appears to be circumscribed to the first days of the maintenance
period.
3. The evidence is strongly suggestive that open market operations were used to
enforce changes in the target during the first sub-sample, in a manner that is
broadly consistent with the traditional liquidity effect.
4. Deviations of the federal funds rate from target are most persistent in the first sub-
sample, which is consistent with the persistence observed in the size of each
operation and would suggest that the Fed required more pressure in the federal
funds market to guide the federal funds accordingly. The degree of persistence in
operations decreases in the second sub-sample and almost completely disappears
in the third sub-sample. However, the persistence of federal funds rate deviations
from target is lower for the second and third sub-samples, suggesting that the Fed
could exercise better control with less operations (see Figure 2).
5. The Response of Term Rates
The previous section investigated the behavior of the federal funds market in response to
the Fed’s practice of announcing changes in the federal funds rate (almost exclusively)
after each FOMC meeting. We argued above that by providing a more regimented
schedule in which to expect changes in the target, the Fed effectively signals its
intentions and thus requires a smaller volume of open market operations. The questions
we investigate in this section are tightly related to this scheduled-signaling mechanism. In
particular, we explore the manner in which the scheduling of FOMC meetings
coordinates the formation of expectations and the price discovery process of term rates.
The results that we report below borrow heavily from Kuttner (2000).
It is important to begin by dissecting changes in the target into an expectational
and a surprise component on account that it is the second of these components that will
ultimately affect term rates in a rational expectations environment. Market expectations
of changes in the target can be directly computed with data from the federal funds futures21
market. Specifically, Kuttner (2000) suggests that the surprise component of a target
















for all but the first and last days of the month. τ ε~ denotes the surprise component of a
target change, ms denotes the number of days in month s, τ is the day of the month in
which the target is changed and
0
,τ s f denotes the spot-month futures rate at date τ of
month s over which the average effective, overnight funds rate is computed to price the
contract. The expected component of a target change can then be calculated as
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A broad interpretation of the rational expectations hypothesis would suggest that
current term rates already incorporate expectations of future changes in the federal funds
rate. Therefore, while at time t the forecast Et(∆ ft+1
*) is likely to be an important
explanatory factor, at time t+1 only the forecast error 1
~
+ t ε should have any significant
effect on term rates. More specifically, let ∆ Rt denote a generic term rate, then a simple
regression such as,
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16 For a detailed discussion of Kuttner’s (2000) methodology, the reader is directed to consult the original
reference.22
would likely present a non-zero, significant β coefficient. However, how does the FOMC
schedule and the expectation that changes in the federal funds rate target are almost
exclusively announced after FOMC meetings modify the predictions embodied in
equations (10) and (11)?
We argue that although expectations derived from the futures market from federal
funds detect upcoming fluctuations in the federal funds rate, unless these fluctuations are
associated with FOMC dates, they more likely represent technical and transitory
deviations of the federal funds rate from target rather than a new level for the target itself.
Consequently, outside FOMC dates, these futures-market based expectations are unlikely
to have any significant effect on term rates.
To test this hypothesis, we use daily data on the repo (RP), the three-month T-Bill
(TB3), and the ten-year T-Bond (TB10) rates over the period May 18, 1989 to August 14,
2000.
17 In particular, consider estimating equation (10) but where the sample is restricted
to meet the following three criteria:
•  |Et(∆ ft+1
*)| > 0.125, that is, to eliminate noisy fluctuations in the futures market,
we limit the sample to dates in which expectations of a change in the federal
funds rate amounted to at least 0.125% in absolute value.
•  dt
FOMC = 0 (where dt
FOMC = 1 if there is an FOMC meeting in day t, 0 otherwise),
i.e., we exclude FOMC dates.
•  dt
CHANGE = 0 (where dt
CHANGE = 1 if the target is changed in date t, 0o t h e r w i s e ) ,
i.e., we exclude dates when the target was changed.
Imposing these restrictions reduces the sample to 184 observations. Table 6 reports the
results of this experiment for ∆ Rt = RP, TB3, and TB10. As is clear from Table 6, there is
virtually no response of term rates to expectations of changes in the federal funds rate
outside FOMC dates or dates when the target is changed. The explained variation in all
cases remains below 4% and although the coefficients are technically statistically
significant, they are clearly indistinguishable from 0 by any reasonable economic metric.
The results are virtually identical when the restriction |Et(∆ ft+1
*)| > 0.125 is eliminated,
allowing the sample to expand to 2817 observations.
17 May 18, 1989 is the earliest date for which we have reliable data on the federal funds futures market
which was established in 1988.23
A natural complement to the previous experiment is to concentrate on dates in
which the target was in fact changed and proceed on to ask whether or not changes in the
target executed outside FOMC meetings were more influential. Under the view that the
FOMC schedule regiments expectations on when are target changes most likely to occur,
a target change announced outside an FOMC meeting constitutes a rather unusual event
(such observation is born out by the data, as we discussed above). Additionally, we are
interested in examining what Kuttner (2000) labels as “the timing hypothesis,” that is,
whether the mere advancement or postponement of anticipated rate changes will have a
smaller effect on term rates than actions that truly signify a directional change in the
policy stance. In essence, this means that the forecast error t ε~ may, at times, represent
having gotten the timing of a target change incorrectly although that target change may
have been widely expected to occur sometime in the near future.
A simple way to explore both of these issues simultaneously is to estimate a
regression on a sample that only contains dates of a target change, similar in spirit to
Cook and Hahn (1989), and Kuttner’s (2000) equation (8). Consider the dummy variable
dτ
FOMC which is described above and then define an additional dummy variable, dτ
SWITCH
which takes the value of 1 if the τ
th target change has the opposite sign of the τ -1target
change and is 0 otherwise. The choice of this variable definition is based on the
observation, reported among other places in Rudebusch (1995), that the Fed typically
changes the target in the same direction but only infrequently chooses to move the target
in the opposite direction. Thus, the variable dτ
SWITCH will help us identify the importance
of the timing hypothesis, albeit admittedly, in a crude way. With these considerations in
mind, the regression we estimate is
τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ
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where ∆ Rτ = RP, TB3, and TB10. The results of this experiment are reported in Table 7.
The discussion of the results centers on the β 2
i coefficients (i=0 ,f ,s ), which are the
coefficients associated with the prediction errors, and therefore, whose estimates should24
be close to the value of 1. The β 1
i coefficients (i=0 ,f ,s ) are those associated with the
expectational component of target changes and should therefore be statistically irrelevant
under the rational expectations hypothesis. Generally speaking, this is in fact what we
find.
The parametrization of equation (12) measures the response of term rates to




2 ˆ ˆ β β + . This response takes on the values 0.20 (0.86), 0.62 (0.32) and –0.23 (0.32) for
the repo, three-month T-Bill and ten-year T-Bond rates respectively (standard errors in
parenthesis). These values are not particularly close to the canonical value of 1 (specially
for the ten-year T-bond rate). However, if instead we consider the same response when
the target change is announced outside and FOMC meeting (i.e., looking at
0
2 ˆ β in
isolation), notice that the values uniformly increase to 0.54 (0.31), 0.73 (0.11), and 0.44
(0.11) for RP, TB3, and TB10 respectively (standard errors in parenthesis). These values
are closer to 1 and highlight the “specialness” of FOMC meeting days.
In addition to these results, equation (12) also allows us to investigate the validity
of Kuttner’s (2000) timing hypothesis. Thus, the response of term rates to surprise target
changes that correspond to a shift in the direction of previous changes can be measured as




2 ˆ ˆ ˆ β β β + + . For RP, TB3, and TB10, these coefficient
estimates and their standard errors are respectively, 0.19 (1.47), 1.08 (0.55), and 1.48
(0.55), which strongly suggest (except for the repo rate) that the timing hypothesis is
important. Finally, we consider the extreme case of a target change that corresponds to a
shift in direction, which is made outside and FOMC meeting. This corresponds to the




2 ˆ ˆ β β + . The estimates of this type of response for RP, TB3, and TB10 (standard errors in
parenthesis) are 0.52 (1.73), 1.19 (0.64), and 2.15 (0.65), respectively.
Overall, these results are consistent with the rational expectations hypothesis and
the view that the FOMC schedule imposes a specific timetable on which to expect
decisions that will affect the level of the federal funds rate target. As the maturity of the
term rate considered increases, we find that the response to unusual events (such as a
target change announced outside and FOMC meeting that constitutes a reversal in the25
direction of previous changes) also becomes stronger. The timing hypothesis advanced by
Kuttner (2000) appears to be well supported by the data. By contrast, the response to
target changes that take place at FOMC meetings is weaker as long as these changes
follow the same general direction of previous changes.
6. Conclusions
After having maintained the federal funds rate unchanged since September 4, 1992, the
February 3-4, 1994 FOMC meeting concluded with the decision to modify the federal
funds rate target, and to ensure that this policy decision was properly communicated to
the markets, it was disclosed by way of a public announcement. Thus, what began as an
experiment has now become part of the Fed’s tradition, a tradition that is now shared by
numerous central banks. One of the practical implications of this policy consists of the
ability to control the federal funds rate with little or no immediate action by the Trading
Desk – the announcement effect. The market’s understanding and expectation of how the
Fed operates has also molded the behavior of market rates at different maturities.
The daily conduct of open market operations is a complex process: it is influenced
by a large variety of technical factors that are often unrelated to monetary policy per se.
In addition, a number of procedural changes have characterized the reserves market and
the manner the Desk manages the reserve need. These difficulties notwithstanding, the
analysis based on the pattern and choice of open market operations confirms the notion
that the Desk is able to communicate a new level for the federal funds rate with a smaller
volume of interventions than was characteristic prior to 1994. Traders are placing
increased credibility in the Desk’s commitment to maintain the federal funds rate on
target, a notion that is cemented by the clarity that the regular announcement of FOMC
outcomes provides.
Ultimately, the goals of monetary policy require that the Fed be successful in
guiding the market’s expectations of future policy moves and thus, that there be some
synchronicity in longer maturity rate movements. The evidence we provide on this front
is consistent with the view that expectations are updated with the FOMC calendar. Long-26
term rates appear to react strongly when the Fed initiates policy moves in a new direction
in a manner consistent with the timing hypothesis, but remain quiescent subsequently.
Shorter-term rates track the Fed’s policy moves more closely, as one would expect from
their maturity, but react less strongly to unusual events.
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Appendix
A.1 Open Market Operations
The Trading Desk of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York implements open market
operations. There are two types of operations depending on the duration of the operation.
If the reserve need or surplus is expected to be persistent, then the desk may conduct
permanent operations through outright purchases or sales of securities. Outright
purchases or sales of Treasury debt (i.e. Treasury Bills or Treasury Coupon securities) are
permanent operations that are generally executed in the market at times when the
estimated need or surplus is expected to be large and is expected to extend a few periods
into the future (these variations in the need are mostly associated with increases in the
demand for currency). Typically, the Desk does not address small reserve shortages or
excesses of brief duration with outright operations, which entail greater execution costs
and can be affected by market price changes.
Alternatively, if staff projections indicate a short-lived need to add or drain
reserves, the Desk undertakes temporary operations. Temporary operations are
repurchase agreements (RPs) or matched sale purchase (MSP) transactions. Note that a
purchase adds to reserves whereas a sale drains reserves from the banking system. In
managing bank reserves, the Manager (of the Trading Desk) finds it helpful to put
reserves in or take them out in large volume for one day to a few days at a time. RPs and
MSPs are temporary transactions that enable the Desk to respond quickly when reserves
fall short of desired levels or prove to be in excess. Temporary operations are
particularly helpful in dealing with the uncertainties present in the reserves market (see
Meulendyke, 1998, chapter 7).
According to Feinman (1993), in the pre-1994 regime the Federal Reserve signals
the strongest protest of a policy easing with overnight RP transactions. Meanwhile, term
RPs contain a much weaker rate protest. Edwards (1997) notes that term repurchase
agreements were considered more technical and do not aim to signal target changes.
Term RPs are usually designed to leave reserve shortages of moderate size to be
addressed with additional RPs (Hilton, 1999).29
It is important to note that there has been an increasing tendency over the last
decade for the Desk to be in a position of needing to add reserves (see the discussion
below). This is because the Desk does not want to drain reserves during periods where
low operating balances might lead to late day firmness in the money market (see Cohen,
1996), and also because of the Desk’s response to an increasing demand for currency
over time. Consequently, because the portfolio has been expanding in recent years,
MSPs have been used less frequently than RPs (see Meulendyke, 1998, chapter 7).
A.2 The Autoregressive Conditional Hazard Model (ACH)
The methodology described in this section is explained in detail in Hamilton and
Jordá (2000) and Demiralp and Jordá (2000). For brevity, we describe only the salient
features. Details about the estimates and the forecasts themselves are available from the
authors upon request.
The ACH model seeks an answer to the following question: What is the
probability that during the next maintenance period, the target will be changed,
conditional on information available today? Denote with xt = 1 if the target is changed
during the maintenance period t and xt = 0 otherwise. Then, the conditional probability of
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where ω is a constant term, wj(t-1) is an index that records the j
th most recent target
change as of time (t-1), ) 1 ( − t wj u therefore denotes the duration between the j
th two most
recent target changes as of date t-1 and zt-1is a vector of exogenous variables. The
specification in (A.1) is dynamic in a manner similar to conventional ARMA and ARCH
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which can be maximized by conventional numerical techniques.
Forecasting target changes with the ACH
The ACH produces forecasts of when the target will be changed next, which can be easily
combined with forecasts of the expected magnitude of the target change when it occurs.
Due to the discrete nature of target changes, which typically come in increments of 25
basis points, we model this process with an ordered response model with normal errors
(ordered probit model, or OP for short). The ACH and the OP are then estimated over
two samples at a maintenance-period frequency: April 25, 1984 to February 2, 1994 and
February 16, 1994 to August 23, 2000. The first sample was modeled with an ACH(1,1)
that included as exogenous variables, whether the FOMC met during the current and
previous maintenance period or not, and the most recently available information on CPI
inflation. The corresponding OP contained as regressors the size of the previous target
change, the spread between the target and the one-year T-bond, the spread between the
target and the discount rate, and the ratio of nonborrowed reserves to lagged total
reserves. The second sample required an ACH(1,1) that included the same FOMC
variable from the first sample, the absolute value of the spread between the ten-year T-
bond and the federal funds rate, and the duration since the last change in the prime rate.
The companion OP model included as regressors, the value of the most recent target
change, the spread between the six-month T-Bill and the ten-year T-bond and the spread
between the target and the prime rate.31
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Table 2 – Signs of the Coefficients in the TOBIT Regressions: Purchase Operations
1984-1994 1994-1998 1998-2000
Need Expected Need Expected Need Expected
Day OB TB PB OB TB PB OB TB PB OB TB PB OB TB PB OB TB PB
Thursday
1
+...... + + .- - + + ..... + + .
Friday
2
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Thursday
6
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0 -- - . + . . . . .
1 .+. -.+ ...
2 -- . . . . . . . .
3 ... ... ...
Note: ++/-- indicates a positive/negative coefficient significant at the 95% confidence level. +/- indicated a
positive/negative coefficient significant at the 90% confidence level. “.” Indicates a coefficient that is not
statistically significant. OB = overnight purchase operations; TB = temporary purchase operations; and PB
= outright (permanent) purchase operations.33
Table 3 – Signs of the Lagged Coefficients of the Open Market Data in the TOBIT
Regressions by Sub Sample
Sample 1 – 1984-1994
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3
OB TB PB OS TS PS OB TB PB OS TS PS OB TB PB OS TS PS
OB + + + + .-..+......+...-
TB + + + + + - -..- - + + ..... + + ...-
PB . + ++ - -- . . ++ ++ -- -- . . . ++ -- -- .
OS .- - - - + + + + + + .-.....-....
TS .... + + ..... + + ..... + + .
PS ..................
Sample 2 – 1994-1998
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3
OB TB PB OS TS PS OB TB PB OS TS PS OB TB PB OS TS PS
OB ++ . . -- . . ++ ++ . . . . ++ ++ . . . .
TB + + ..-..............
PB ....... + + + + ...-.+...
OS .- -. + + ............+.
TS ..................
PS .. + + ...-...........
Sample 3 – 1998-2000
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3
OB TB PB OS TS PS OB TB PB OS TS PS OB TB PB OS TS PS
OB ..--. + + ........-...
TB ............-..-..
PB ........ + + .....+.. +
OS --...........-..+ .
TS ..................
PS ......... + + . +. + + ....
Note: ++/-- indicates a positive/negative coefficient significant at the 95% confidence level. +/- indicated a
positive/negative coefficient significant at the 90% confidence level. “.” Indicates a coefficient that is not
statistically significant. OB = overnight purchase operations; TB = temporary purchase operations; and PB
= outright (permanent) purchase operations. OS = overnight sale operations; TS = temporary sale
operations; and PS = outright (permanent) sale operations.34
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Frequency 10.04% 26.50% 58.16% 13.06% 24.89% 32.44% 31.91% 11.18% 16.51%
Notes: Equation (6) is estimated for each type of purchase operation. The coefficient estimates in this table
correspond to the bottom part of Table 2. Frequency refers to the proportion of days in the sample the
operation was used. ** (*) indicates significant at the 95% (90%) confidence level. OB = overnight
purchase operations; TB = temporary purchase operations; and PB = outright (permanent) purchase
operations.35
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Frequency 5.33% 4.33% 4.80% 3.22% 1.44% 0.00% 0.00% 1.69% 2.96%
Notes: Equation (6) is estimated for each type of sale operation. Frequency refers to the proportion of days
in the sample the operation was used. ** (*) indicates significant at the 95% (90%) confidence level. OS =
overnight sale operations; TS = temporary sale operations; and PS = outright (permanent) sale operations.36
Table 6 – The Response of Term Rates to Expectations Outside FOMC days
t t t t u f E R + ∆ + = ∆ + ) (
*
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Sample: May 18, 1989 to August 14, 2000 excluding FOMC meetings, days when the target was changed,
and days for which |Et-1(∆ ft
*)| < 0.125. Observations:184. Standard Errors in parenthesis. Term rates
measured in percentages. * (**) indicates significant at the 10% (5%) confidence level.37
Table 7 – The Response of Term Rates when the Target is Changed
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R2 0.23 0.70 0.42
Sample: May 18, 1989 to August 14, 2000, only target changes included. Observations: 45. Standard Errors
in parenthesis. Term rates measured in percentages. * (**) indicates significant at the 10% (5%) confidence
level.
Responses to the Surprise component
Timing of Target Change Repo 3-month 10-year
At FOMC: β 2














At FOMC + SWITCH: β 2
0 + β 2







Outside FOMC + SWITCH: β 2







Standard errors in parenthesis. * (**) indicates significant at the 10% (5%) confidence level.38
Figure 1: A General Model of the Reserves Market with Anticipated Policy Actions
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Persistence of the Deviaton of the Federal Funds
Rate from Target
Note: shaded area corresponds to Fridays.